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mariacallous · 10 months ago

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In November 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) met in Algiers and issued a Declaration of Independence, proclaiming the state of Palestine. The declaration grounded the new state in the 1947 U.N. Partition Resolution, which called for two states, one Arab and one Jewish. The PLO’s goal, as with Hamas today, had previously been the “liberation” of all of Palestine, from the river to the sea. In the 1988 declaration, the PLO reversed that position. Four weeks later, the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist.

Immediately following the proclamation, Algeria, the host country, announced its recognition of the state of Palestine. And almost immediately, the United States launched a worldwide effort to persuade other countries to withhold recognition and thwart the Palestinians in their campaign to gain admission into international organizations.

Today, 139 countries recognize the state of Palestine, but this does not include the major Western democracies. The state is a member of many international organizations but not the United Nations, where the United States, through the Security Council, has blocked admission. Yet since 2012, Palestine has been recognized by the United Nations as a non-member observer state.

Now, triggered by the war in Gaza, this may change. British Foreign Secretary David Cameron, has stated that the United Kingdom is considering recognizing Palestine and supporting its membership in the United Nations. More importantly, it has been reported that this is also under consideration by the U.S. State Department.

Prior to Oct. 7, 2023, recognition by the United States and admission of the state of Palestine to the United Nations would have been a major accomplishment for Fatah (the biggest secular Palestinian political party), the PLO, and for Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who also holds the title of President of the state of Palestine.

This would not have fundamentally changed the widespread Palestinian judgment that the entire Oslo Accords process was a disaster for the Palestinians, but it would have kindled a small spark of hope and would have counted for something in Fatah’s struggle with Hamas, which replaced the PLO as the home for Palestinians who remained committed to liberating all of Palestine and to the use of armed struggle to do so.

If it happens now, Hamas, whose popularity among Palestinians has grown and will grow further if there is a release of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the Israeli hostages, will likely take credit. It will maintain that this recognition, which the PLO was not able to accomplish, demonstrates that only armed struggle produces results.

And within Israel, such moves will likely increase the political fortunes of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. U.S. President Biden’s advocacy of the two-state solution is already being used by Netanyahu as a central theme in his effort to win the next Israeli election, despite his dismal polling numbers. He claims that, were it not for him, Israel would be presently facing a Hamas-controlled state in the West Bank, and that only he can stand up to U.S. pressure.

Key figures in the Israeli center who might challenge Netanyahu in the next election are sufficiently concerned that they have asked Washington to stop talking, at least in public, about the two-state solution. Unilateral recognition of Palestine by the United States would be used by Netanyahu in his efforts to stoke Israeli fears.

That said, U.S. recognition of Palestine and its admission to the United Nations can be hugely important in the effort to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but to do so, such steps must be part of a comprehensive peace plan, one that acknowledges the new reality that Oct. 7 has created for Israelis. That day, Israelis underwent a trauma whose impact will endure. Israelis lost a sense of security that had long become part of their lives. They lost trust in their government and in their military, their intelligence services, and their technology. Hamas’s slaughter awakened the historic memories of the Holocaust and of centuries of pogroms.

Post-Oct. 7, no Israeli government will ever agree to a Palestinian state in the West Bank unless there is substantial confidence that it will not be a threat to Israel. No set of written arrangements, including provisions that say the Palestinian state will be demilitarized, will supply Israelis with the degree of confidence that is necessary before they will risk a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank.

If there is an answer, it will require abandoning the defunct Oslo paradigm, which sees Palestinian statehood emerging as a result of successful end-of-conflict negotiations. The alternative is a sovereignty-in-Gaza-first approach: to test Palestinian statehood in Gaza first, and only if it is successful over an agreed period, to then move to negotiations on extending Palestinian sovereignty to the West Bank.

The Gaza-first approach to Palestinian statehood has a long history. Its strongest Israeli proponent was Shimon Peres. Back in 1995, at Peres’s request, I presented to Yasser Arafat a 20-point Gaza-first proposal I had developed. Arafat abruptly rejected it, not unreasonably, fearing that Gaza-first would become Gaza-last. But that was in the heyday of the Oslo Accords, when other paths to statehood seemed possible. Today, for Israelis, actual lived experience with a trial state in Gaza may be the only path to the two-state solution.

Here are the main components of what a “Gaza-first plan” might look like—one that integrates U.S. recognition of the state of Palestine into a path to peace:

The United States (or a group of Arab states including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar) will put forward a plan for a trial Palestinian state in Gaza, with permanent status negotiations between Israel and the state of Palestine to be held only after a successful, three-year demonstration by the new state that it is stable, committed to peace with Israel, and has been successful in achieving de facto sovereignty over Gaza. The State of Palestine would have to attain respect for its authority from nonstate actors, especially Hamas. Hamas would have to relinquish its ability to initiate hostilities, including the possession of heavy weapons, missile production, and weapons smuggling.

If the PLO accepts this Gaza-first test of Palestinian sovereignty, then the United States would stop blocking Palestine’s admission to the U.N. and commit to recognizing the state of Palestine once it establishes de facto sovereignty over Gaza.

The PLO or Fatah, under Arab auspices, would then begin negotiations with Hamas over the group’s future. The goal will be agreement that once Israel withdraws from Gaza, Hamas will accept the authority of the Palestinian state. Further, agreement will be sought on conditions that Hamas-affiliated candidates will have to meet in order to participate in Palestinian elections, including acceptance of the Declaration of Independence’s language that Palestine “rejects the threat or use of force, violence and terrorism, against … the territorial integrity of other states.”

If the PLO-Hamas negotiations are successful, Israeli forces in Gaza will be rapidly replaced by security forces from the Palestinian Authority. If they are not successful, then Palestine will receive assistance from other Arab states, or an international force, to establish its sovereign control of Gaza, leading to Israel’s exit.

Once the state of Palestine establishes control over Gaza, it would be recognized by the United States and Israel—but with its recognized sovereignty, at this point, limited to Gaza. Upon Israeli recognition of the state of Palestine, the Palestinian Authority will cease to exist. All its administrative functions and assets and bureaucracy in the West Bank will be assumed by the state of Palestine.

The emerging state will hold its first elections in both the West Bank and Gaza. All candidates for office will be required to meet the conditions discussed above.

Upon the election of the first government of Palestine, the two states, Israel and Palestine, will exchange ambassadors and pledge peaceful coexistence. The United States will sponsor negotiations between the two states on lifting the blockade of Gaza and on how to prevent weapons smuggling into Gaza.

To demonstrate that it is serious about future negotiations over the West Bank, Israel will also agree to a complete halt to the expansion of West Bank settlements, and to control and punish violence and intimidation of Palestinians by Israeli settlers.

After the transfer of power to the state of Palestine, the settlement freeze, and the opening of negotiations on lifting the blockade of Gaza, Saudi Arabia will normalize relations with Israel.

Upon a declaration by Palestine that it has attained de facto sovereignty over Gaza, the three-year trial period will commence. If it is successful, as judged by an implementation commission composed of the United States and the Arab countries that have recognized Israel, then Washington will convene permanent status talks between the two states. Those negotiations will be based on the final status parameters articulated by then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in 2016. These not only included the demilitarization of the Palestinian state and security provisions for Israel, but also a commitment that the borders of Palestine in the West Bank will be based on the 1967 lines, modified by equal land swaps, and with a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem.

Making Palestinian statehood a reality would allow Palestinian moderates to take over Gaza from the Israelis without appearing to be Israeli subcontractors or a police force furthering the occupation. Without this fundamental change in its role, the notion of a “revitalized Palestinian Authority” taking effective control of Gaza, as Biden has proposed, is delusional.

Much will depend on the size and capabilities of Palestine’s security forces. But most of all, success or failure will depend on whether the Palestinian people themselves believe that this statehood trial really offers a path to comprehensive independence. If so, succeeding in the trial will have widespread Palestinian support, and this in turn will affect Hamas’s willingness to accept the authority of the state. Essentially, Hamas will be faced with a choice between marginalization or evolution.

Ironically, this approach may also appeal to many Israelis who currently oppose a Palestinian state. This is because, apart from fierce right-wing ideologues, most of the Israeli opposition to a Palestinian state rests on the belief that real peace with such a state is not possible. For those firmly of this view, a Gaza-first test may appeal to them, if only because they believe that Palestine will prove to be a failed state.

For the centrists seeking to lead Israel, a Gaza-first trial is a pragmatic option that serves to neutralize Netanyahu’s claim that only he can prevent the imposition of a Palestinian state with West Bank sovereignty. Further, testing sovereignty does not tie Israel’s hands if a Palestinian state is unable to gain actual sovereign power over Gaza. At the same time, a trial state in Gaza potentially offers Israel a chance that it would not otherwise have: a way to permanently withdraw from Gaza, rather than having to face an interminable insurgency.

Gaining Saudi recognition of Israel by committing only to good-faith testing of Palestinian sovereignty will significantly enhance interest in the plan for all Israelis.

For the moderate Palestinian leadership, this framework provides a major achievement towards a full end to the occupation, with actual sovereignty in some part of Palestine. And recognition by the United States will mean a Palestinian Embassy in Washington, a U.S. ambassador to Palestine, and worldwide acceptance of symbols of Palestinian sovereignty including passports and a currency.

Palestinians will be wary, as Arafat was in 1995, that Gaza-first will become Gaza-last, but such fears will be alleviated by a permanent halt to Israeli settlement expansion.

For those on both sides who are deeply committed to resolving the conflict, a Gaza-first approach provides an opportunity to demonstrate that lasting peace is possible, as well as an opportunity to develop new approaches to final-status arrangements outside the Oslo paradigm. Most importantly, it offers a credible path to the end of the conflict, without playing into Netanyahu’s hands.

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technuter · 2 years ago

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The Promise of 5G: Early adopters have high expectations from 5G

Ericsson released a report on the ‘Promise of 5G’ in India carried out by Ericsson ConsumerLab. The study carried out in the second quarter this year reflects the views of 300 million daily smartphone users in urban India. The report highlights five key insights that will drive the uptake of 5G in India. According to the study, consumer 5G readiness is high in India. Intention to upgrade to 5G in urban India is two times higher than their counterparts in markets like the UK and US where 5G has already been launched. Over the past two years, India has witnessed three times increase in smartphone users who own a 5G handset. The study reveals that 100 million+ users with 5G- ready smartphones wish to upgrade to a 5G subscription in 2023 while more than half of them are open to upgrading to a higher data tier plan in the next 12 months. 5G network superiority could emerge as a driver for consumer loyalty with 59 percent of smartphone users intending to upgrade to 5G in the first 12 months. Within those who plan to upgrade to 5G, 36 percent plan to churn to the best provider of the 5G network when it is available. 60 per cent of early adopters who already have a 5G-capable phone expect 5G to bring new innovative applications, which are considered more appealing than better coverage. These users are even willing to pay a 45-percent premium a for plan bundled with novel experiences provided their expectations are met. 5G will improve network satisfaction in India especially for the gaming experience. 7 in 10 of current smartphone users are looking forward to enhanced video streaming quality once they switch to 5G. 5G-ready users are already engaging in using more digital services compared to 4G users – 60 percent of 5G-ready users are already today engaging with more than three digital services. 5G will trigger an increase in consumption of new format high-resolution video streaming and cloud gaming. The study tested 27 different 5G enhanced services with Indian consumers to reveal the top 10 services that Indian consumers wish for on their 5G plans. These include: Health and Fitness; 360-degree live video streaming; cloud gaming; 5G TV Package; Virtual meeting space; immersive education; best-seat event experience; interactive calling; location-based AR shopping and VR Shopping. Jasmeet Sethi, Head of Ericsson ConsumerLab says:” The transition to 5G provides an opportunity for service providers in India to strengthen their position in the consumer market, with a focus on 5G quality and availability. More innovative experiences need to be bundled to meet the expectations of early adopters to successfully monetize 5G.” Nitin Bansal, Head of Ericsson India and Head of Network Solutions, South- east Asia, Oceania and India, Ericsson, said, “Even as 5G will provide immersive experiences to urban customers, it will also play an important role in achieving India’s digital inclusion goals, especially in bringing broadband to rural and remote homes. Our new generation 5G and multi-band radios that will be deployed across networks will allow for the best user experience while the improved energy efficiency will reduce the cost of operations and impact on the environment, thereby ensuring sustainable and responsible 5G rollout.“ Ericsson today announced the introduction of ultra-lightweight Massive MIMO 32T32R radios as the best fit for India’s needs – AIR 3219 and AIR 3268 (Antenna Integrated Radio). These 5G radios, which will be produced in India, are energy efficient and come with coverage-enhancing features such as Uplink Booster that make them very relevant for a densely populated country like India. These radios have been designed for 5G mid-band Massive MIMO performance to deliver the benefits of deployment simplicity and improved energy efficiency. With their reduced weight, these Ericsson radios make installations easy on towers, rooftops, poles, and walls. Read the full article

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maritimecyprus · 7 years ago

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(http://www.MaritimeCyprus.com) The IMO Assembly met for its 30th session at IMO Headquarters in London, United Kingdom (27 November to 6 December). The Assembly was the largest-ever gathering at IMO Headquarters in London, attended by some 1,400 participants, including 56 at the ministerial level, from 165 Member States, as well as observers from inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Strategic directions and vision adopted The Assembly adopted its strategic plan for 2018-2023, including a revised mission statement, a vision statement (included for the first time) and seven newly-identified strategic directions for IMO, placing the Organization firmly on route to supporting the implementation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The strategic directions are:

Improve implementation – ensuring regulations are effectively, efficiently and consistently implemented and enforced.

Integrate new and advancing technologies in the regulatory framework – balancing the benefits derived from new and advancing technologies against safety and security concerns, the impact on the environment and on international trade facilitation, the potential costs to the industry, and their impact on personnel, both on board and ashore.

Respond to climate change – developing appropriate, ambitious and realistic solutions to minimize shipping’s contribution to air pollution and its impact on climate change.

Engage in ocean governance – engaging in the processes and mechanisms by which the use of the oceans and their resources are regulated and controlled.

Enhance global facilitation and security of international trade – addressing things like arrival and departure formalities, documentation and certification, and generally reducing the administrative burdens that surround ship operation.

Ensure regulatory effectiveness – improving the actual process of developing regulations, to make them more effective; gathering more data, and being better and smarter at using it to make decisions; getting better feedback from Member States and the industry and improving the way IMO learns from experience and feeds those lessons back into the regulatory process.

Ensure organizational effectiveness – increasing the overall effectiveness of IMO, including the Member states, non-governmental organizations, donors, the Secretariat –all the many stakeholders in the Organization as a whole.

Vision statement: “IMO will uphold its leadership role as the global regulator of shipping, promote greater recognition of the sector’s importance and enable the advancement of shipping, whilst addressing the challenges of continued developments in technology and world trade; and the need to meet the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

To achieve this, IMO will focus on review, development and implementation of and compliance with IMO instruments in its pursuit to proactively identify, analyse and address emerging issues and support Member States in their implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”

Support for UN SDGs through technical cooperation The Assembly adopted three resolutions which focus on IMO’s capacity-building work to support the implementation of the SDGs.

The first resolution covers the linkages between IMO’s technical assistance work and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and requests the Technical Cooperation Committee to give high priority to those activities which not only promote the early ratification and effective implementation of IMO instruments but also contribute to the attainment of the SDGs, taking into account the special needs of the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS) and the particular maritime transport needs of Africa.

The second outlines guiding principles of IMO’s integrated technical cooperation programme in support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It urges Member States to ensure the integration of maritime issues within their United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF) which will determine their national priority areas of funding and support for maritime technical assistance activities.

The third covers financing and partnership arrangements for an effective and sustainable integrated technical cooperation programme. It invites Member States, international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations and industry to engage actively in the support of technical cooperation activities through voluntary cash donations to the TC Fund; financial allocations to IMO multi-donor trust funds; multi-bilateral arrangements; voluntary donations of interest earnings under the Contributions Incentive Scheme; and in-kind support through the provision of no-fee consultants, hosting of technical assistance events and the donation of equipment.

Focus on marine plastic pollution The Assembly recognized that the ongoing problem of marine plastic pollution required further consideration as part of a global solution within the framework of ocean governance. This is in line with the UN SDG 14 (Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development) which has a target to prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of all kinds, in particular from land-based activities, including marine debris and nutrient pollution by 2025.

IMO’s MARPOL treaty addresses garbage under its Annex V, which bans the discharge of plastics from ships into the oceans. The treaties which regulate the dumping of wastes at sea (London Convention and Protocol) also have role to play in addressing plastic in the oceans from land-based sources.

The Assembly recognized the role that the Organization has and continues to play in addressing this problem. The Assembly encouraged Member States, Parties to MARPOL Annex V and international organizations to submit concrete proposals to the next sessions of the Marine Environment Protection Committee and the meeting of the Parties to the London Convention and Protocol which meet during 2018.

Polar code second phase welcomed The IMO Assembly welcomed the planned work within the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) to build on the already-adopted Polar Code and move forwards with looking at how vessels not currently covered by its requirements might be regulated in future.

The Polar Code, which entered into force on 1 January 2017 under both the SOLAS and MARPOL treaties, provides additional requirements for safe ship operation in polar waters and the protection of the polar environment.

The work on the second phase, to address other vessels, including fishing vessels and smaller ships not covered by the SOLAS treaty, will be initiated at MSC 99 in May 2018.

IMO number scheme extended to fishing vessels and other vessels The Assembly agreed to extend the IMO Ship Identification Number Scheme to more vessels, on a voluntary basis, to support ship safety and pollution prevention by being able to more easily identify vessels.

The number scheme applies to ships over 100 GT and is mandatory for passenger ships of 100 gross tonnage and upwards and all cargo ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards. In 2013, the Assembly agreed to voluntary extension to fishing vessels over 100 gt. Further voluntary application is now extended to fishing vessels of steel and non-steel hull construction; passenger ships of less than 100 gross tonnage, high-speed passenger craft and mobile drilling units, engaged on international voyages; and to all motorized inboard fishing vessels of less than 100 gross tonnage down to a size limit of 12 metres in length overall authorized to operate outside waters under national jurisdiction of the flag State.

Identifying and tracking fishing vessels operating at sea and being able to establish their ownership is an important part of ongoing work to tackle illegal, unreported, unregulated (IUU) fishing. IMO is working closely with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) as well as other stakeholders, to tackle IUU fishing.

IMO is also encouraging States to ratify the Cape Town Agreement on fishing vessel safety, to bring this important treaty into force.

Port State Control – revised procedures adopted Port State control plays a crucially important role as the second line of defence against sub-standard ships. The Assembly adopted revised Procedures for Port State Control. The resolution contains a comprehensive compilation of guidelines relevant to Port State Control. It updates the previous Procedures for PSC adopted in 2011 (resolution A.1052(27)). The revisions include, in particular, guidelines on the ISM Code; the certification of seafarers, hours of rest and manning; and procedures regarding voluntary early implementation of amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention and related mandatory instruments.

Ratification of 2010 HNS Protocol urged The Assembly adopted a resolution calling on States to consider ratifying a key treaty which will provide a global regime for liability and compensation in the event of an incident involving the international or domestic carriage by sea of Hazardous and Noxious Substances, such as chemicals, LPG and LNG.

The resolution calls on States to consider ratifying, or acceding to, the 2010 HNS Protocol and to implement it in a timely manner. It also urges all States to work together towards the implementation and entry into force of the 2010 HNS Protocol by sharing best practices, and in resolving any practical difficulties in setting up the new regime.

Delegating the authority of issuing certificates of insurance The Assembly adopted a resolution to allow for the delegation of authority to issue certificates of insurance under the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992 (the 1992 Civil Liability Convention) and the 2010 HNS Convention.

Unlike the Bunkers Convention 2001, the 2002 Athens Convention and the 2007 Nairobi Wreck Removal Convention, the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 2010 HNS Convention do not provide an explicit framework for the delegation of authority to issue certificates of insurance. The resolution confirms that a State Party to the 1992 Civil Liability Convention or the 2010 HNS Convention can authorize an institution or an organization recognized by it to issue the certificates of insurance or other financial security required by these Conventions.

It also reminds States Parties that the delegation of authority to issue the certificates of insurance or other financial security required by the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 2010 HNS Convention would not affect the potential liability the delegating State may have in relation to those certificates.

Launching missiles without warning condemned The Assembly endorsed the decision of the IMO Council to strongly condemn recent missile launches by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea which posed clear and serious danger to the safety of shipping in international trade.

IMO budget adopted The Organization’s results-based budget and work programme for 2018 to 2019 was adopted by the Assembly. The budget includes an assessment on Member States of £31,864,000 for 2018 and £33,242,000 for 2019.

Election of the IMO Council The Assembly elected the 40-Member IMO Council for the next biennium 2018 to 2019 (see Briefing 35/2017).

The Assembly directed the Council at its 120th session in June 2018 to examine the processes and procedures of the Assembly and Council, with a view to making suggestions for reform.

Election of Council Chair The newly elected Council met on 7 December and elected Mr. Xiaojie Zhang (China) as Chair for 2018-2019. The election of the Vice-Chair was postponed until July 2018. The Council expressed its deep appreciation for the outstanding efforts and achievements of the previous Chair, Mr Jeff Lantz (United States).

Source: IMO

IMO shares its vision and strategic directions (www.MaritimeCyprus.com) The IMO Assembly met for its 30th session at IMO Headquarters in London, United Kingdom (27 November to 6 December).

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hudsonespie · 5 years ago

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IMO Pushes Forward With Work To Meet Ship Emission Reduction Targets

The IMO Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships has made significant progress in pushing forward with work to help achieve the ambitious targets set out in the initial IMO strategy on reduction of GHG emissions from ships, which aims, as a matter of urgency, to decarbonize international shipping in this century.

IMO is committed to working to combat climate change, in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 13 on climate action.

National Action Plans – draft MEPC resolution agreed

The working group agreed the draft text of a resolution to be put forward to the next Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) for adoption. The text would urge Member States to develop and update a voluntary National Action Plan (NAP) with a view to contributing to reducing GHG emissions from international shipping.

Image Credits: imo.org

It suggests such National Action Plans could include but are not limited to: (a) improving domestic institutional and legislative arrangements for the effective implementation of existing IMO instruments, (b) developing activities to further enhance the energy efficiency of ships, (c) initiating research and advancing the uptake of alternative low-carbon and zero-carbon fuels, (d) accelerating port emission reduction activities, consistent with resolution MEPC.323(74), (e) fostering capacity-building, awareness-raising and regional cooperation and (f) facilitating the development of infrastructure for green shipping.

The resolution would invite Member States to elaborate those arrangements (legal, policy, institutional, etc.) that they put in place or plan to do so to support emission reduction from ships, in accordance with their national conditions, circumstances and priorities.

The resolution would encourage those States which had already adopted national action plans to share their experiences with IMO.

The draft resolution will be submitted to the next Marine Environment Protection Committee session, MEPC 75 (30 March to 3 April 2020) with a view to its adoption.

Candidate measures to further reduce GHG emissions

IMO has already adopted mandatory technical and operational measures to improve the energy efficiency of ships and reduce GHG emissions, including the energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for new ships and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) for all ships of 400 GT and above (read more here). The initial strategy lists a number of candidate measures which could also be considered to further reduce emissions and help achieve the targets in the strategy, in particular 40% reduction of carbon intensity from shipping by 2030. Short-term measures could be measures finalized and agreed by the Committee between 2018 and 2023, although in aiming for early action, priority should be given to develop potential early measures with a view to achieving further reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping before 2023. Dates of entry into force and when the measure can effectively start to reduce GHG emissions would be defined for each measure individually. A procedure for assessing the impact on States of a measure has been approved.

During the working group session, a number of proposals were discussed.

The group noted that the proposals discussed fell into two goal-based approaches, a technical approach and an operational approach. Further discussion would be needed at the next intersessional working group meeting to develop such proposals further.

Technical approach

Proposals for a technical approach which were discussed included an Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index (EEXI), which could require ships to meet set energy efficiency requirements after the measure taking effect. Other technical proposals relate to mandatory power limitation on ships.

Operational approach

Operational approaches would include focusing on strengthening the ship energy efficiency management plan, as required in SEEMP. This include proposals for mandatory carbon intensity reduction targets. Operational proposals also include measures to optimize speed for the voyage. Proposals to limit ship speed were also discussed.

There was general agreement in the group that a mandatory goal-based approach for both the technical and operational approaches would provide the needed flexibility and incentive for innovation (a goal-based approach would set the objective to be achieved, while leaving room for a range of methods or innovation to achieve the set goal).

The group agreed that the technical and operational approaches should be further developed in parallel, with informal coordination before the next intersessional meeting.

Assessment of impacts on States

Proponents of the various proposals were invited to provide further details on the initial impact assessment of their proposal, with a view to identifying the remaining issues to be further considered, including whether the proposed measure may generate disproportionately negative impact on some States. Key underlying issues identified by the chair for further consideration included, inter alia: the vital role of shipping for food security and disaster response; the impact on cost of transport and if cost change can be passed on to the customer or not; and special challenges faced by some remote areas.

Alternative fuels

With a longer-term perspective, and in order to encourage the uptake of alternative low- and zero-carbon fuels in the shipping sector, the Working Group also agreed on the establishment of a dedicated workstream for the development of lifecycle GHG/carbon intensity guidelines for all relevant types of fuels. This could include, for example, biofuels, electro-/synthetic fuels such as hydrogen or ammonia, etc. Many participants to the meeting highlighted the importance of undertaking this work as soon as possible, in order to pave the way for the decarbonization of the shipping industry.

Next meetings

The sixth session of the Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships met 11-15 November at IMO Headquarters in London, United Kingdom. It was attended by nearly 400 representatives from nearly 70 Member States, as well as from the UNFCCC, the European Commission, the League of Arab States and around 30 non-governmental organizations.

To keep up the momentum, a further seventh meeting of the Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships will be held 23-27 March 2020. This is just before and back to back with the next Marine Environment Protection Committee session, MEPC 75 (30 March to 3 April 2020). The MEPC is the decision-making body.

The MEPC is also expected to establish a Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships, to meet during the MEPC session.

MEPC 76 is scheduled to meet 19-23 October 2020. MEPC 76 is expected to receive the completed Fourth IMO GHG Study.

Fourth IMO GHG Study

The Fourth IMO GHG Study will include the following:

Inventory of current global emissions of GHGs and relevant substances emitted from ships of 100 GT and above engaged in international voyages. The inventory should include total annual GHG emission series from 2012 to 2018, or as far as statistical data are available.

GHGs are defined as the six gases initially considered under the UNFCCC process: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). The inventory should also include other relevant substances that may contribute to climate change, including Black Carbon (BC).

Estimates of carbon intensity (estimates of world fleet’s CO2 emissions per transport work, from 2012 to 2018, or as far as statistical data are available).

Possible estimates of carbon intensity of international shipping for the year 2008 (the baseline year for the levels of ambition identified in the Initial Strategy).

Scenarios for future international shipping emissions 2018-2050

(The previous, Third IMO GHG Study, was published in 2014).

The Initial IMO Strategy

Reference: imo.org

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hudsonespie · 7 years ago

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IMO Assembly Adopts Vision And Strategic Directions

The IMO Assembly met for its 30th session at IMO Headquarters in London, United Kingdom (27 November to 6 December). The Assembly was the largest-ever gathering at IMO Headquarters in London, attended by some 1,400 participants, including 56 at the ministerial level, from 165 Member States, as well as observers from inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Strategic directions and vision adopted

The Assembly adopted its strategic plan for 2018-2023, including a revised mission statement, a vision statement (included for the first time) and seven newly-identified strategic directions for IMO, placing the Organization firmly on route to supporting the implementation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The strategic directions are:

Improve implementation – ensuring regulations are effectively, efficiently and consistently implemented and enforced.

Respond to climate change – developing appropriate, ambitious and realistic solutions to minimize shipping’s contribution to air pollution and its impact on climate change.

Engage in ocean governance – engaging in the processes and mechanisms by which the use of the oceans and their resources are regulated and controlled.

Image Credits: imo.org

Vision statement:

“IMO will uphold its leadership role as the global regulator of shipping, promote greater recognition of the sector’s importance and enable the advancement of shipping, whilst addressing the challenges of continued developments in technology and world trade; and the need to meet the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Support for UN SDGs through technical cooperation

The Assembly adopted three resolutions which focus on IMO’s capacity-building work to support the implementation of the SDGs.

Focus on marine plastic pollution

The Assembly recognized that the ongoing problem of marine plastic pollution required further consideration as part of a global solution within the framework of ocean governance. This is in line with the UN SDG 14 (Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development) which has a target to prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of all kinds, in particular from land-based activities, including marine debris and nutrient pollution by 2025.

Polar code second phase welcomed

The IMO Assembly welcomed the planned work within the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) to build on the already-adopted Polar Code and move forwards with looking at how vessels not currently covered by its requirements might be regulated in future.

The work on the second phase, to address other vessels, including fishing vessels and smaller ships not covered by the SOLAS treaty, will be initiated at MSC 99 in May 2018.

IMO number scheme extended to fishing vessels and other vessels

The Assembly agreed to extend the IMO Ship Identification Number Scheme to more vessels, on a voluntary basis, to support ship safety and pollution prevention by being able to more easily identify vessels.

IMO is also encouraging States to ratify the Cape Town Agreement on fishing vessel safety, to bring this important treaty into force.

Port State Control – revised procedures adopted

Port State control plays a crucially important role as the second line of defence against sub-standard ships. The Assembly adopted revised Procedures for Port State Control. The resolution contains a comprehensive compilation of guidelines relevant to Port State Control. It updates the previous Procedures for PSC adopted in 2011 (resolution A.1052(27)). The revisions include, in particular, guidelines on the ISM Code; the certification of seafarers, hours of rest and manning; and procedures regarding voluntary early implementation of amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention and related mandatory instruments.

Ratification of 2010 HNS Protocol urged

The Assembly adopted a resolution calling on States to consider ratifying a key treaty which will provide a global regime for liability and compensation in the event of an incident involving the international or domestic carriage by sea of Hazardous and Noxious Substances, such as chemicals, LPG and LNG.

Delegating the authority of issuing certificates of insurance

The Assembly adopted a resolution to allow for the delegation of authority to issue certificates of insurance under the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992 (the 1992 Civil Liability Convention) and the 2010 HNS Convention.

The resolution confirms that a State Party to the 1992 Civil Liability Convention or the 2010 HNS Convention can authorize an institution or an organization recognized by it to issue the certificates of insurance or other financial security required by these Conventions.

Launching missiles without warning condemned

The Assembly endorsed the decision of the IMO Council to strongly condemn recent missile launches by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea which posed clear and serious danger to the safety of shipping in international trade.

IMO budget adopted

The Organization’s results-based budget and work programme for 2018 to 2019 was adopted by the Assembly. The budget includes an assessment on Member States of £31,864,000 for 2018 and £33,242,000 for 2019.

Election of the IMO Council

The Assembly elected the 40-Member IMO Council for the next biennium 2018 to 2019 (see Briefing 35/2017). The Assembly directed the Council at its 120th session in June 2018 to examine the processes and procedures of the Assembly and Council, with a view to making suggestions for reform.

Election of Council Chair

The newly elected Council met on 7 December and elected Mr. Xiaojie Zhang (China) as Chair for 2018-2019. The election of the Vice-Chair was postponed until July 2018. The Council expressed its deep appreciation for the outstanding efforts and achievements of the previous Chair, Mr Jeff Lantz (United States).

Full list of resolutions adopted:

A.1110(30) Strategic plan for the Organization for the six-year period 2018-2023

A.1111(30) Application of the strategic plan of the Organization

A.1112(30) Results-based budget for the 2018-2019 biennium

A.1113(30) Revision of the Organization’s financial regulations (effective 1 January 2018)

A.1114(30) Presentation of accounts and audit reports

A.1115(30) Arrears of contributions

A.1116(30) Escape route signs and equipment location markings

A.1117(30)) IMO Ship Identification Number Scheme

A.1118(30) Revised Guidelines on the implementation of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code by Administrators

A.1119(30) Procedures for Port State Control, 2017

A.1120(30) Survey Guidelines under the Harmonized System of Survey and Certification (HSSC), 2017

A.1121(30) 2017 Non-exhaustive list of obligations under instruments relevant to the IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code)

A.1122(30) Code for the transport and handling of hazardous and noxious liquid substances in bulk on offshore support vessels (OSV Chemical Code)

A.1123(30) Implementation and entry into force of the 2010 Hazardous and Noxious Substances Protocol

A.1124(30) Delegation of authority to issue certificates of insurance or other financial security required under the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 2010 Hazardous and Noxious Substances Convention

A.1125(30) Relations with non-governmental organizations

A.1126(30) Linkages between IMO’s technical assistance work and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

A.1127(30) Guiding principles of IMO’s integrated technical cooperation programme in support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

A.1128(30) Financing and partnership arrangements for an effective and sustainable integrated technical cooperation programme

A.1129(30) World Maritime University and International Maritime Law Institute students visiting IMO Headquarters

A.1130(30) Charter of the World Maritime University

IMO Assembly The 30th Assembly of IMO met in London at IMO Headquarters from 27 November to 6 December 2017. It was attended by some 1,400 participants, including 56 at the ministerial level, from 165 Member States, as well as observers from inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations and from the World Maritime University (WMU), the International Maritime Law Institute (IMLI).

The Assembly normally meets once every two years in regular session. It is responsible for approving the work programme, voting the budget and determining the financial arrangements of the Organization. It also elects the Organization’s 40-Member Council.

Reference: imo.org

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